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Abstract 
This paper finds that coherent regulatory policies can boost investment in 
network industries of OECD economies. Rate-of-return regulation is generally 
thought to result in overinvestment, while incentive regulation is believed to 
entail underinvestment. Yet, previous empirical work has generally found that 
the introduction of incentive regulation has not systematically changed 
investment in network industries. According to the theoretical literature, 
regulatory uncertainty exposes both types of regimes to the danger of 
underinvestment. However, regulatory uncertainty is arguably higher under 
rate-of-return regulation because investment decisions (what can be included in 
the rate base) are usually evaluated in a discretionary manner, while firms 
operating under incentive regulation are less affected by this behaviour. In 
addition, incentive regulation encourages investment in cost-reducing 
technologies. Using Bayesian model averaging techniques, this paper shows 
that incentive regulation implemented jointly with an independent sector 
regulator (indicating lower regulatory uncertainty) has a strong positive impact 
on investment in network industries. In addition, lower barriers to entry are 
also found to encourage sectoral investment. These results support the 
importance of implementing policies in a coherent framework. 
JEL Classification: L51; L97; L98. 
Keywords:  network industries; regulation; incentive regulation; price cap; cost-plus regulation; 
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1. Introduction 
Liberalisation, privatisation and the introduction of incentive regulation has often been viewed as 
a way to promote infrastructure investment in network industries. For example, the separation of 
electricity generation and transmission in the United States was intended to boost investment by 
encouraging more entry into the market (Ishii and Yan, 2006). Yet, problems arising after the 
opening-up of network industries have often been attributed to falling investment in network 
infrastructure. For example, a series of fatal train accidents in the United Kingdom (Southall in 
1997, Paddington in 1999 and Hatfield in 2000) was widely blamed on under-investment, while 
the blackouts in California in 2001 and in New York, London, Italy, Denmark and Sweden in 
2003 were largely blamed on under-investment in electricity generation or transmission grids 
(Bialek, 2004; Pollitt, 2007; Hirschhauser et al. 2004; Joskow, 2006).). 
Part of the divergence between ex ante expectations and ex post outcomes can be explained by 
incoherencies in the overall framework of the reforms. For example in the electricity sector, 
Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) argue that introducing sustainable competition in electricity generation 
and distribution requires action with respect to liberalisation, privatisation and regulation. First, 
vertical unbundling of generation, transmission and distribution (and horizontal splitting in 
generation) is necessary to ensure competition by preventing a vertically-integrated company 
acting strategically to curb competition and to prevent new entry. Second, privatisation of public 
incumbents in generation and distribution is desirable to ensure a level playing field which may 
otherwise be prevented by their easier access to capital than for new entrants. Finally, setting up 
an independent regulator is needed to supervise the transmission network operator and regulate 
prices were needed. It is also claimed that the choice of the regulatory regime may also have a 
bearing on the outcome. For instance, traditional forms of regulation such as rate-of-return 
regulation that caps the return on the capital and more recent forms of regulation comprising price 
cap regulation that incentivises the regulated firms to become more efficient may influence the 
investment decisions of the firms. 
Against this backdrop, this paper reviews theory and empirical evidence on the effect of 
regulation on investment in network industries and on the relevance of consistency of the 
regulatory framework for sectoral investment behaviour. The paper then assesses empirically the 
impact of the overall regulatory framework on sectoral investment in network industries in a 
sample of OECD countries. The main findings of the literature review and the empirical analysis 
are the following:    
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First, theory suggests that none of the existing regulatory regimes is immune to the danger of 
over- or under-investment in network infrastructure. Whether a particular regime provides firms 
incentives to invest depends to a large extent on the particular set-up of the system. While rate-of-
return regulation is traditionally thought to result in over-investment, the more recent literature 
emphasised that under-investment can also occur under certain circumstances. The regulated firm 
may choose to under-invest if the timing of the regulatory cycle is too short to recoup investment 
costs or, it may also decide not to invest, delay investment or invest sequentially (or to increase its 
leverage) in the case of regulatory uncertainty. The regulated firm may also cut back investment 
in the face of uncertainty arising from the use of ex post rather than ex ante information with 
regard to the inclusion of investment in the rate base. 
Second, while it is widely accepted that incentive price regulation is a powerful tool to eliminate 
short-run cost inefficiencies, it is also thought to incite regulated firms to under-invest in network 
infrastructure with a view to increase short-term profits. Like rate-of-return regulation, incentive 
regulation may depress investment if the regulatory cycle is not long enough to break even, if the 
regulator revises efficiency targets before the next review period, if it sets unrealistic efficiency 
targets or if the rate base is evaluated with the wisdom of hindsight. The fact that risk is shifted 
back from consumers to shareholders implies higher risk and higher cost of capital also 
potentially translating into less investment.  
Third, regulated firms may nevertheless want to increase investment spending because incentive 
price regulation offers more opportunities to increase revenue and profit by investing in cost-
reducing technologies. A regulated firm will engage to upgrade its existing infrastructure if it 
decreases operating costs, if it permits the launch of new profitable services or to improve service 
quality. 
Fourth, the empirical literature suggests that shifting away from traditional rate-of-return 
regulation did not generally cause under-investment in network industries. For instance, overall 
investment in the UK railway sector did increase in the aftermath of privatisation and the 
introduction of incentive regulation. Empirical studies also highlight that incentive regulation was 
very helpful in promoting the deployment of new technologies in the US telecommunications 
sectors in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Finally, the empirical results in this paper suggest that the introduction of incentive price 
regulation or the establishment of an independent sector regulator do not have a positive influence 
on investment by themselves. However, once these policies are implemented jointly, they are   4
associated with a significant increase in investment. This result highlights the importance of the 
overall coherence of the general regulatory environment in supporting investment incentives. 
Furthermore, the cross-sectional empirical analysis suggests that lower entry barriers encourage 
investment in the network industries, confirming earlier panel data results by Alesina et al. 
(2005). 
The outline of the paper is the following. Section 2 reviews the theoretical arguments with regard 
to the relation between the regulatory framework and investment in network industries. Section 3 
provides an overview of the empirical literature. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the methodology and 
data. Finally, Section 6 presents the results. 
2.  Investment behaviour under different regulatory regimes 
It is well-known that an unregulated monopoly tends to produce lower quantities and charge 
higher prices than would be required by welfare maximisation. This may imply that the 
monopolist under-invests  in network capacity relative to the social optimum. Furthermore, the 
monopolist will invest later than is socially optimal because it compares the costs related to its 
investment only with producer surplus and fully ignores consumers’ surplus. 
One way of raising social welfare is to introduce competition in network industries that are 
dominated by a monopolist.
2 However, parts of the vertically-integrated network industries 
remain natural monopolies and will remain dominated by a single firm because of large fixed 
costs and economies of scale or scope relative to demand. But even if competition can be 
introduced in other parts of the industry, the state may want to maintain regulation if market 
power persists resulting from too few market participants and the small market share of new 
entrants, especially in the initial stages of liberalisation. Furthermore, when competition is not 
feasible, appropriate regulatory frameworks can, nonetheless, simulate a competitive 
environment. The question is, therefore, to what extent these different regulatory regimes 
influence investment incentives. 
Differences in price regulation have often been seen as particularly important in determining 
investment incentives. While cost-based or rate-of-return regulation is generally thought to bring 
about over-investment (Averch and Johnson, 1962), incentive price regulation is often considered 
                                                      
2.  Liberalisation and competition can bring large efficiency gains in industries with lower 
economies of scale and scope ( such as telecommunications) but efficiency gains may be more 
limited in the presence of large economies of scope (like in the railway sector) (Newbery, 2003 
and Pittman, 2005).    
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as introducing the risk of under-investment in the longer run (Armstrong and Sappington, 2006). 
However, this characterisation is too stark as the extent to which a particular regime supports 
investment depends considerably on the overall set-up of the regime. In this context, the next sub-
sections discuss the factors that will result in over- and under-investment. 
2.1. Rate-of-return  regulation and over-investment 
Under rate-of-return regulation, prices are set to account for the production costs of the firm and 
the margin (the “plus factor”) that is allowed by the regulator or agreed on between the regulator 
and the firm.
3 The “plus factor” can specifically relate to the return the firm is allowed to earn on 
its capital. This return, often coined “fair” rate of return, should allow the firm to recover 
investment costs. The prices are adjusted upon the initiative of the regulated firm, the regulator or 
consumer representatives if production costs increased or decreased after the last regulatory 
review. 
Rate-of-return regulation may encourage the regulated monopoly to over-invest in network 
capacity and lead to allocative inefficiency. Over-investment occurs if the regulated fair rate of 
return exceeds the cost of capital leading the regulated monopoly to substitute capital for labour 
in order to increase profit. At the same time, the high capital-labour ratio will result in a 
production structure that is not cost efficient (Averch and Johnson, 1962; Takayama, 1969). 
Over-investment due to high capital-labour ratio will result in higher levels of quality if service 
quality is a function of capital intensity.
4 More generally, over-investment and the ensuing excess 
capacity may be used as a strategic tool to deter potential entrants and empire-building managers 
may be tempted to increase investments because a larger company size results in higher status and 
material rewards (Starkie, 2006). 
2.2.  Incentive price regulation and under-investment 
The underlying idea of price cap regulation is to simulate conditions of perfect competition by 
imposing a price cap over the regulatory period adjusted for changes in (exogenous measures of) 
                                                      
3.  The costs of a regulated firm can be split into operating costs, the rate of return on the firm’s 
capital, and the depreciation of the firm’s capital. In this context, the regulator sets the prices so 
that expected revenues for the period ahead equals expected operating costs for the next period, 
the rate of return on the firm’s capital plus the depreciation of the capital stock. 
4.  The over-supply of service quality may be exacerbated when firms anticipate a change from a 
low-powered (rate-of-return) to a high-powered (incentive) regulatory price regime if they 
believe that they can continue to provide the same service quality relying on equipment installed 
before the regime change (Sappington, 2005).   6
input prices, quality and efficiency targets imposed by the regulator. The possibility that costs and 
prices can diverge during the regulatory period provides firms incentives to implement cost-
reducing investment and innovations aimed at improving operating efficiency to outperform the 
efficiency target. 
Incentive regulation, such as a price cap that does not account for quality changes appropriately, 
encourages the regulated firm to increase profit by reducing service quality at unchanged prices. 
And typically, there have been complaints that service quality declined shortly after price caps 
were introduced.
5 In order to prevent the firm from reaping extra profit by reducing quality, the 
regulator may wish to adjust the regulated price by some measure of quality. 
2.3 Regulatory  features  affecting investment behaviour 
There are a number of additional features of regulation besides the basic pricing regime that can 
result in under-investment.
6 These include basically, the so-called regulatory asset base, the 
timing of regulatory reviews and uncertainty about the regulator’s actions (‘regulatory 
opportunism’). 
The regulatory asset base and cost disallowances 
The so-called “regulatory asset base” or “rate base” is a critical regulatory parameter, which 
constitutes the base for the calculation of the rate of return. If the rate base includes all assets of 
the firm, the firm may be tempted to invest imprudently. To avoid this problem, regulators may 
select investments that they allow to be included in the rate base.
7 Such “cost disallowances” may 
lead firms to cut back or reschedule investment plans (Guthrie, 2006). If the regulator assesses a 
firm’s investment ex post rather than ex ante, it will use information that was not available at the 
time the investment decision was made. Consequently, the regulator may not allow the inclusion 
of the whole investment to the rate base. 
                                                      
5.  This has been reported in the United Kingdom and the United States' telecommunication sectors, 
for example (Laffont and Tirole, 2001) 
6.  Other factors, not considered here, that can influence investment include difficulties in obtaining 
environmental licenses and planning permission or complying with health and safety 
requirements. 
7.  While this is primarily a concern for rate of return regulation, the regulator may take into account 
planned investment during regulatory price reviews in incentive price regulation. For example, 
Hern (2001) reports that the water regulator in the United Kingdom allowed generous capital 
expenditure programmes until 1999, at which point it set more ambitious efficiency targets with 
lower implied rate of returns.    
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A regulated firm that faces possible cost disallowance because the regulator relies on ex post 
information will be more prudent and will pick only those investment projects that are subject to 
low future shocks. In particular, a long time lag between the decision and the completion of an 
investment project makes investment vulnerable to future shocks. Hence, investors will act with 
caution in selecting projects with long lead time and smaller projects involving less sunk costs 
will be chosen over large projects that offer economies of scale. Industries with fast technological 
progress are also more likely to be hit by demand shocks and by a fall in capital costs. Therefore, 
an ex post evaluation of investment by the regulator would make incumbents in these sectors 
overly cautious. 
Timing of the regulatory review 
When the regulatory cycle is sufficiently long relative to investment, firms will invest to benefit 
from cost-reducing investments in the case of incentive price regulation and because all costs are 
passed onto consumers under rate-of-return regulation. If the firm can choose the timing of the 
investment and if the timing of the regulatory reviews is exogenous, the firm will invest after the 
regulatory review to maximise payoff. The closer to the next review, the more likely that 
investment will be delayed until after the beginning of the  next regulatory period and only then  
will the firm seek to lower costs. If prices are reviewed in reaction to the profitability of the firm 
operating under rate-of-return regulation, the firm will refrain from implementing investments as 
the firm’s rate of return approaches the upper bound. Instead, it will invest right after the review 
when the rate of return is reset.
8 When the regulatory cycle is too short, firms operating under a 
price cap regime will not be able to benefit from improved efficiency and will have less incentive 
to invest. Under price caps, regulatory reviews are often scheduled every 4 to 5 years. Industries 
subject to comparatively slow technological progress and a low-volatility environment such as the 
water industry can have longer review periods of eight years with an option to request an early 
review (Guthrie, 2006). 
                                                      
8.  Rate-of-return regulation could be viewed as a system where the rate of return of the regulated 
firm fluctuates in a range. If the actual rate of return drops below the “fair” rate of return, the 
firm will request a review for an upward price adjustment, whereas if the firm’s profitability 
increases beyond the “fair” rate of return, well-organised consumers may request a review to 
decrease prices or the regulated firm itself can ask for lower prices in anticipation to the 
consumers’ reaction. As a result, the realised dates of reviews are determined endogenously as a 
function of the firm’s profitability (Joskow, 1974). Endogenous timing has the advantage for the 
firm that it can shift some of the risks onto consumers by requesting an early review if cost 
shocks arise.   8
The regulator’s decision making and uncertainty 
The move from rate-of-return to incentive price regulation shifts risk from consumers to 
shareholders and consequently raises the cost of capital for the regulated firm. The implications 
are that if the regulated firm is not allowed to earn a return on its capital that incorporates the 
higher risk (the implicit rate of return determined by the price cap), it will not invest in new assets 
(Alexander and Irwin, 1996). This risk would be exacerbated in cases when the regulator is 
unduly influenced by politicians or the public and may be tempted to set prices or the rate of 
return too low. Obviously, the regulated firm may choose to reduce investment faced with the risk 
that its rate of return on investment may be seriously constrained. This may further discourage 
high-return and, thus, more risky investments. 
Uncertainty about the regulator’s actions poses a non-negligible threat to investment in network 
industries. If the regulator is unable to make a credible commitment that it will not change prices 
after the firm invests, the firm will tend to under-invest.
9 The regulated firm may either delay 
investment or invest sequentially to see the outcome at the next regulatory review. Regulatory 
uncertainty does not only generate under-investment but will also affect the composition of the 
investment, as the regulated firm may choose a technology with lower fixed costs (Spiegel, 1996). 
The regulated firm can also react to the lack of commitment by issuing more debt. A rise in the 
regulated firm’s leverage (debt-to-equity ratio) increases the probability of future financial 
distress which may in turn induce the regulator to allow higher prices.
 10 However, higher prices 
may not eliminate the under-investment bias because the firm also faces the risk and costs of 
bankruptcy stemming from higher leverage (Spiegel and Spulber, 1994). 
Under-investment resulting from regulatory uncertainty can be mitigated by establishing 
independent regulatory bodies.
11 For example, credibility can be achieved through financial, 
political and institutional independence from the government while being accountable to a 
mandate. This can enhance the time consistency of policy and minimise uncertainty about future 
actions. This sort of regulatory uncertainty can also be alleviated by implementing ex ante profit 
                                                      
9.  The academic literature often uses the term “regulatory opportunism” to define this kind of 
regulatory behaviour. 
10.  For instance, Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) and Bortolotti et al. (2007) report evidence that 
regulated firms have high debt to equity ratios in the United States and in Europe. 
11.  This is similar to the problem of a central bank that seeks to reduce inflation but that cannot fully 
commit itself to its final objective (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Stern and Trillas, 2003).    
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sharing schemes that stipulate that the regulated firm must pay back part or the totality of the 
excess profit to consumers.
12 
Regulatory uncertainty may not be fully eliminated, however. For example, under incentive price 
regulation the potential efficiency gains may not be fully exploited if the regulated firm faces the 
risk that the regulator would impose price caps at the next regulatory review which are partly 
based on its past performance.
13 Under rate-of-return regulation, what is included in the 
regulatory asset base is likely to be a persistent area of uncertainty for the regulated firm. 
Implications for the different pricing regimes 
In sum, the differences in investment behaviour between rate-of-return and incentive price based 
regulation can rest on features of the regulatory regime. As firms under rate-of-return regulation 
are comparatively unresponsive to changes in demand, the regulator needs to play an important 
role in determining what investment is needed. Furthermore, due to the inherent tendency of 
investment being allocatively inefficient there will always be a conflict between the firm and the 
regulator over what is included in the regulatory asset base. To some extent, this conflict will be 
ex post and regulatory decisions may not adequately reflect ex ante risks. In this light, the 
regulator needs to be well informed to minimise allocative inefficiency and ensure that 
investment is sufficiently reactive to changes in demand and technology. By contrast, firms 
operating under incentive price regulation regimes will have higher levels of allocative efficiency 
and will have incentives to invest in cost-saving technology. Such firms, however, face higher ex 
ante market-driven risk, which -- other things being equal -- requires a higher rate of return. To 
the extent that regulatory risk and uncertainty are present (driven by the timing of the reviews and 
changes to the implicit rate of return during pricing reviews, for example), investment will also be 
affected. Regulatory uncertainty and risk can be potentially mitigated by granting the regulator 
independence and a suitable mandate. 
                                                      
12.  Profit sharing was introduced in 1987 in the US telecommunication sector and by 1993 almost 
half of US states adopted this regime (just to switch to price cap from the mid-1990s). Under 
profit sharing, several rates of return may be specified. Below a given rate of return (for instance 
10%), the regulated firm can keep all profits, for a range of rates of return (for instance between 
10% and 15%), it can retain part (for instance 50%) of the profits, whereas above a specific level 
(for instance 15%), excess profit has to be disbursed to consumers. Threshold rates of return, the 
shares to be paid above the threshold and the regularity with which profit rates are monitored 
have implications on the extent to which profit sharing reduces or increases incentives for cost 
efficiency and investments (Greenstein, McMaster and Spiller, 1995). 
13.  This is known as the ‘ratchet effect’ which creates an upper bound on the regulated firm’s 
efficiency gains (Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole, 1985) and lowers the firm’s cost-reducing 
investment.   10
3. Empirical  evidence 
Rail 
Some of the problems following the liberalisation in the 1990s of rail tracks in the United 
Kingdom have been blamed on massive under-investment. A more detailed analysis of the 
underlying figures suggests however no systematic under-investment in comparison with the 
previous system at the sectoral level. Pollitt (2000) finds that in constant 1995 prices between 
1981 and 1995 investment increased significantly in British Rail (as well as in airports and in the 
water industries, while no significant changes took place in telecommunications, electricity and 
gas industries). Investment in rail transportation did not drop but rather increased in 1999 
following privatisation in 1997. Furthermore, the investment rate was high in historical terms 
after privatisation (compared to the 1970s and 1980s) and the introduction of incentive regulation 
(Clark, Elsby and Love, 2001).
14 Overall, incentive regulation did not appear to cause a major 
disruption in sectoral investments of the regulated sectors. The overall investment figures in the 
British railway sector until 1999 mask, however, a steady increase in investment in the railway 
network and a fall in investment in rolling stock (Affuso and Newbery, 2000).
15 
Telecommunications 
There are a number of studies that show a strong positive relationship between investment and 
incentive price regulation in the US telecommunication industry. For instance, Ai and Sappington 
(2002) note that past research has shown that incentive regulation was more powerful than 
traditional rate-of-return regulation during the late 1980s and early 1990s for the deployment of 
                                                      
14.  Measuring investment at constant prices or as a percentage of GDP may not appropriately 
capture the quality dimension of investment. For instance, Clark, Elsby and Love (2001) show 
that while being stable over the 1980s, total investment in roads in the United Kingdom picked 
up between 1990 and 1994 and then sharply declined from 1994 to 1999, in part because road 
maintenance became more efficient over time. Kinnunen (2006) argues that the decline in real 
investment in Finnish electricity distribution after liberalisation is not necessarily an indication 
of lower volumes of physical investment. The same amount of network can be built at lower cost 
if new technology or the implementation of it becomes less costly.  
15.  Affuso and Newbery (2000) point out two possible reasons for a decline in rolling stock 
investment. First, contracts awarded to the train operation companies shorter than the lifetime of 
the rolling stock discourages investment. Second, in accordance with real option theory, train 
operators may postpone investment in the face of uncertainty with regard to future demand. 
Affuso and Newbery (2000) analyse the determinants of discretionary investment (investment 
other than committed to the regulator) of 25 train operators between 1997 and 1999. Their 
estimation results indicate that shorter contracts promote discretionary investment and that 
higher demand uncertainty and higher profits are positively correlated with discretionary 
investment.     
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new technology. They then demonstrate that different forms of incentive regulation helped 
encourage the deployment of fibre optic cable during the 1990s. However, the different forms of 
incentive regulation they considered were not generally more conducive to raising overall 
investment relative to firms operating under rate-of-return regulation.
16 Greenstein, McMaster and 
Spiller (1996) also find strong econometric evidence in favour of the investment promoting effect 
of price cap regulation in the US telecommunication sector. In particular, when controlling for 
local demographic and economic factors, firm-specific financial indicators and the general 
regulatory environment, the authors unravel that investment in fibre-optic cable deployment, 
ISDN and software updates during the late 1980s and early 1990s was substantially higher under 
price cap regimes.
 They estimate that in the United States at the end of the period under study, 
fibre-optic cable deployment would have been by 75% higher if price cap regimes had been in 
place everywhere. 
A two-way causal link seems to exist between the incumbent’s and facilities-based entrants’ 
decisions to deploy fibre ring in the same city (Woroch, 2000).
17 On the one hand, incumbents 
react swiftly to the deployment of fibre rings by new entrants. This can be interpreted as a 
predatory response or because new entry is viewed as signalling new profit opportunities. On the 
other hand, new entrants invest in their own network as a result of the incumbent’s investment 
decisions. Furthermore, the estimation results reveal that the incumbent’s level of investment 
does not depend on the regulatory policy with regard to the access of their network by new 
providers whilst new entrants invest more if they can access the incumbent’s network. 
Other evidence is less supportive of the role of incentive regulation in promoting the deployment 
of new technology. For example, Floyd and Gabel (2003), using a cross sectional dataset for 
2001, find that some types of incentive regulation are associated with both lower and higher 
investment rates for four kinds of new technologies, relative to rate-of-return regulation.
18 To 
some extent, these findings may also reflect other differences in the regulatory regime. For 
instance, empirical evidence for the US telecommunication sector suggests that regulators tend to 
                                                      
16.  The results of Ai and Sappington (2002) also provide some weakly significant and not very 
robust evidence that incentive regulation and competition may reinforce each other’s effect on 
investment. Their approach controlled for multi-collinearity in a large pool of possible 
explanatory variables and they accounted for potential endogeneity of the regulatory regime.  
17.  The sample contains firm level data concerning 128 US cities from 1983 to 1992. 
18.  The types of new technologies were packet switching, digital signal 1, digital signal 3 and optical 
carrier.   12
set lower access prices and more liberal entry conditions in price-cap regimes than in rate-of-
return regimes (Lehman and Weisman, 2000). 
We contribute to the literature in the remainder of the paper by looking at the impact of the 
regulatory regime and regulatory independence on sectoral investment in selected OECD 
countries. We first describe our data and our empirical model, then go on by presenting our 
estimation strategy and finally present the estimation results. 
4.  Data issues and testable relationships 
The primary interest of the empirical work lies in assessing the impact of the regulatory setup on 
investment decisions in: electricity, gas and water supply; road, rail, water and air transportation; 
and telecommunications. Information on the type of regulatory regime and the independence of 
the sectoral regulator was derived from ad hoc surveys concerning infrastructure regulation and 
investment in OECD member countries (see Annex). Regulatory regimes are divided into three 
broad categories: cost-based regulation (rate of return regulation), incentive price regulation; and 
no regulation (or where pricing has been deregulated). 
Questionnaire responses indicate that cost-based regulation is the most popular form of regulation 
(Figure 1). Out of the 15 sectors covered, nine sectors are dominated by cost-based regulation, 
four sectors are mostly deregulated (electricity and gas generation, water transportation and 
internet services), while incentive regulation is the most popular form of regulation in fixed line 
telecommunications services. Furthermore, incentive regulation has a non-negligible role in other 
seven sectors (electricity and gas transmission and distribution, road and air transportation and 
fixed line networks).    
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Figure 1.  Regulatory regimes (late 2007 or early 2008) 
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Figure 2.  Regulatory independence (late 2007 or early 2008) 
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Figure  2 shows that regulators are overwhelmingly independent in the electricity, gas and 
telecommunications sectors, while regulators tend to be part of government agencies or ministries 
in transportation and in the water industry. Two measures of regulatory independence were 
constructed. The first was whether the regulator was independent of the government. The second 
measure was a gauge of de facto independence assessing the extent to which the executive can 
influence the regulator’s decisions and operation (using responses from the OECD infrastructure 
questionnaire).
19 The two variables are not significantly different. The type of price regulation 
regime was interacted with the regulator’s independence variable to see whether 
complementarities between them matter for sectoral investment. 
As questionnaire responses only provide a snapshot of regulation in late 2007 and early 2008, the 
data on the type of regulatory regime do not have a time dimension. For this reason, only cross-
sectional regressions are carried out in the analysis (with sectoral investment being the dependent 
variable). The regulatory variables include variables capturing the presence of incentive 
regulation (inc), the absence of any price regulation (dereg) (unregulated or deregulated), the 
presence of an independent sector regulator (ri), and an interaction term of incentive regulation 
and regulatory independence (inc*ri). The other explanatory variables are lagged investment 
( 1 − t I ), long-term real interest rate (r) deflated with sectoral deflators, and variables capturing the 
general regulatory environment: entry barriers (entry )
20 and public ownership ( po).
21,22 As a 
result, a linearised version of the following investment function was estimated: 
) * , , , , , , , ( 1 ri inc ri dereg inc po entry r I f I t− =  (1a) 
Investment data are obtained from the OECD’s STAN and SNA (Sectoral National Accounts) 
databases. These two databases have two serious shortcomings. Firstly, the level of 
                                                      
19. The  de jure measure of independence was adjusted for the possibility of the executive overruling 
the regulator’s decisions. The de facto measure of independence was calculated as the average of 
the de jure independence and the possibility of overruling. 
20.  The definition of entry barriers differs across sectors to reflect sector-specific characteristics. For 
more details, see Conway and Nicoletti (2006). The data can be downloaded from: 
   http://www.oecd.org/document/32/0,3343,en_2649_34323_35791136_1_1_1_1,00.html  
21.  Entry barriers and public ownership were used in Alesina et al (2005) who performed a panel 
data analysis of sectoral investment. 
22.  The dependent and explanatory variables are averages for 2001-2006, except the two variables 
capturing the regulatory regime (inc and dereg). In addition, the explanatory variables are 
included with a lag of one period (using averages for 1995 to 2000), except inc and dereg.    
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disaggregation is limited to three broad categories: first, electricity, gas and water supply; second, 
transportation (road, rail, water, air and associated storage); and third, telecommunications (which 
also includes postal services). Secondly, capital stock data needed to calculate the investment-to-
capital stock ratio are available only for a limited number of OECD countries and are not fully 
comparable across countries. In principle, one could compute capital stock series using 
investment flows and the perpetual inventory method, but these estimates are extremely sensitive 
to the underlying assumptions. Given long asset lives, one often still needs an estimate of the 
value of the capital stock to anchor the series, which is not readily available. As a result, sectoral 
value added is used instead to construct an investment to value added ratio at the sectoral level. 
Overall, the sectoral dataset covers 13 countries for the three sectoral aggregates. 
5.  Estimation method: Bayesian averaging of classical 
estimates 
The main empirical approach is Bayesian averaging of classical estimates of the possible 
explanatory variables (e.g. as applied to growth regressions in Sala-i-Martin et al. 2004). For 
comparison purposes, results of OLS estimates are also reported. Bayesian averaging is a 
comprehensive analytical tool to check the extent to which any given explanatory variable 
improves the explanatory power of the estimated models when it is included. In other words, it 
investigates the probability with which any given variable would be included in the estimated 
models. This approach requires the estimation of all possible combinations of the candidate 
explanatory variables (of number K) that is 
K 2 . 
Bayesian averaging of classical estimates (BACE) first determines the (estimated) posterior 
probability attributed to each single model  i M including a given variable, conditioned on the 
underlying dataset y ( ) ( y M P i ). 
∑
=
− −
− −
= K
i
j
i
T
i
k
i
T
i
k
i
i
SSE T M P
SSE T M P
y M P
2
1
2 / 2 /
2 / 2 /
) (
) (
) (  (2a) 
where SSE is the sum of squared residuals, T is the number of observations, k denotes the number 
of explanatory variables included in the specific model and K is the number of all explanatory 
variables considered. Expression (2a) shows the extent to which any given model contributes to 
explaining the dependent variable as compared to the other models. Expression  (2a) is then   16
summed up for the models that contain the variable of interest to obtain the posterior inclusion 
probability of this variable. 
∑
∑
=
=
− −
− −
=
n
j
i
T
i
k
i
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j
k
j
m K
i
j
SSE T M P
SSE T M P
y X P
1
2
1
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2 / 2 /
) (
) (
) (
 (2b) 
Where  ) ( y X P m
 
is the posterior inclusion probability of a given variable. j denotes the models 
that include variable m X  and n equals  2 / 2
K
. If the posterior inclusion probability is higher than 
the prior inclusion probability, one can conclude that the specific variable should be included in 
the estimated models. Since here all possible combinations of the explanatory variables are 
estimated, the prior inclusion probability is 0.50. 
The posterior mean conditional on inclusion ( ) ( y E β ) is the average of the individual OLS 
estimates weighted by  ) ( y M P j . The unconditional posterior mean considers all regressions, 
even those without the variable of interest. Hence, the unconditional posterior mean of any given 
variable can be derived as the product of the conditional posterior mean and the posterior 
inclusion probability. The posterior variance of β  ( ) ( y Var β ) can be calculated as follows: 
∑ ∑
= =
− + =
K K
j
j j j
j
j y E y M P M y Var y M P y Var
2
1
2
2
1
) ) ( ˆ )( ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( β β β β
 (3) 
The posterior mean and the square root of the variance (standard error) conditional on inclusion 
can be used to obtain t-statistics and to determine the significance of the individual variables upon 
inclusion. 
Model averaging is vulnerable to the violation of the basic assumption of homoscedasticity and to 
the presence of outliers (Doppelhofer and Weeks, 2008). Thus White’s heteroscedasticity-
corrected standard errors are used not only for the full sample but also for sub samples that 
exclude one country at a time. This makes it possible to evaluate the impact of individual 
countries on the robustness of the results and to eliminate potential outliers.     
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6. Empirical  Results 
OLS regressions results obtained for the 13 countries with three sectoral aggregates each show 
that lagged investment, barriers to entry and the interaction term including regulatory 
independence and incentive regulation are significantly correlated with contemporaneous 
investment (Table  1).
23 Barriers to entry are found to influence investment negatively. The 
coefficient estimate of -0.046 indicates that a one step reduction in the barriers to entry indicator 
would be associated with a 4.6% increase in the investment ratio.
24 The combination of regulatory 
independence and incentive price regulation has a significant positive effect on investment, 
though when taken separately the two policy variables do not have any significant effect on 
investment. This suggests that a right policy mix is important in determining investment. 
Table  1 reports the main results for the different regulatory variables using Bayesian model 
averaging. If both country and industry fixed effects are used, the most robust findings are that for 
the whole sample and all sub-samples (where one country at a time is dropped) posterior 
inclusion probabilities are always higher than 0.50 in the case of entry barriers and the interaction 
term combining incentive regulation with regulatory independence. Moreover, the size of the 
estimated coefficient is similar to that of the OLS estimate. Table 1 also indicates that in the cross 
section under consideration public ownership is not an important driver of investment rates and 
that the absence of price regulation tends to lower investment. Yet this latter result is not robust to 
changes in country coverage, since it vanishes once the United States is dropped from the sample. 
The size of the coefficient estimates for the different subsamples suggests that on average a 1 step 
change in the interaction term (e.g. a change from 1 to 2) would induce an average increase of the 
investment ratio by 4.9 percentage points. The lowest and highest coefficient estimates give a 
lower and upper bound of the increase in the investment ratio of respectively 1.6 percentage 
points and 6.5 percentage points. A move from the bottom to the top in the observed distribution 
of the interaction term -- from 0 to 4.5 -- would on average increase the investment ratio by 
22.2  percentage points, with the lower and upper bounds being 7.2  percentage points and 
29.3 percentage points. 
                                                      
23.  The estimations use both country-fixed effects and then country- and industry-fixed effects as 
well as the explanatory variables lagged one period. An exception is the variable capturing 
incentive regulation because observations are only available for the most recent period. 
24.  This finding is broadly in line with results reported in Alesina et al. (2005). Using panel data 
estimation methods, Alesina et al. (2005) find that the coefficient estimate for the barriers to 
entry variable is around -0.01.   18
Table 1.  Estimation results, sectoral investment data 
with country and industry fixed effects 
  OLS  Bayesian model averaging 
 Coefficient  p-value  posterior 
inclusion 
probability 
posterior mean 
conditional on 
inclusion 
posterior standard 
error conditional on 
inclusion 
Lagged investment  0.865 0.000  1.000  0.880  0.166 
Real interest rate  0.009  0.130  0.654  0.006  0.003 
Barriers to entry  -0.046 0.008  0.998  -0.043  0.012 
Public ownership  0.004  0.701  0.151  0.000  0.002 
Regulatory independence  -0.026  0.556  0.184  -0.004  0.006 
Incentive regulation  -0.003  0.866  0.141  0.000  0.002 
No price regulation  -0.016  0.133  0.975  -0.015  0.008 
Independence and incentive 
regulation 
interaction term  0.060 0.002  0.996  0.053  0.014 
Adj. R-squared  0.741         
Regressions run      256     
Prior inclusion probability      0.5     
Note: posterior inclusion probability measures the extent to which any given model contributes to explaining the dependent variable as 
compared to the other models. Bold figures for the posterior inclusion probability indicate that it is higher than the prior inclusion 
probability of 0.5. The posterior mean conditional on inclusion is the mean of the individual OLS estimates weighted by the posterior 
inclusion probability of the individual models including a given variable. 
7. Concluding  remarks 
This paper studied the impact of the regulatory setup on sectoral investment in network industries. 
Earlier empirical literature suggested that shifting away from traditional rate-of-return regulation 
did not generally cause under-investment in network industries. For instance, overall investment 
in the UK railway sector did increase in the aftermath of privatisation and the introduction of 
incentive regulation. Empirical studies also highlighted that incentive regulation was very helpful 
in promoting the deployment of new technologies in the US telecommunications sectors in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The empirical results in this paper based on cross-section OLS regressions and on Bayesian 
model averaging suggest that the introduction of incentive price regulation or the establishment of 
an independent sector regulator do not have a positive influence on investment by themselves. 
However, once these policies are implemented jointly, they are associated with a significant 
increase in investment. This result highlights the importance of the overall coherence of the 
general regulatory environment in supporting investment incentives. Furthermore, the empirical 
results show that lower entry barriers encourage investment in the network industries.    
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ANNEX: Data description 
The dependent and explanatory variables are averages for 2001-2006, except the two variables 
capturing the regulatory regime (inc and dereg). In addition, the explanatory variables are 
included with a lag of one period (using averages for 1995 to 2000). For the averages, the data 
series for barriers to entry and public ownership stop in 2003. The other data series end in 2005 or 
2006. 
Dependent variable 
Sectoral investment: investment series in current prices over gross value added in current prices. 
The use of current prices avoids problems arising from changes in quality and in composition. 
Data for three sectors are collected: 1.) electricity, gas & water, 2.) transport (including water, 
road, rail and air transport and storage), 3.) telecommunications. The primary source of the data is 
the OECD’s STAN database (in places complemented by the EU-KLEMS database) 
Regulatory indicators 
Barriers to entry and public ownership: the source of the data is the OECD’s ETCR database. For 
the energy sector, a weighted average using sectoral gross value-added is calculated using data for 
electricity, gas and water. For the transport sector, an arithmetic average is computed using data 
for rail, road and air transportation. The series take the values from 1 to 6. Higher values indicate 
higher barriers to entry and higher public ownership. 
Regulatory independence source: responses to questionnaires sent out to OECD governments. 
The variable takes the value of 1 if the regulator is independent and takes zero if there is no 
regulator, or the regulator is a government agency. Data for subsectors are averaged to get the 
sectoral figures as for barriers to entry and public ownership. The values are not exclusively 0 and 
1 because of the averaging.  
Incentive regulation source: responses to questionnaires sent out to OECD governments. The 
variable ranges from 0 to 6. For the energy sector, it is calculated as a weighted average using 
sectoral gross value-added for electricity, gas and water. For each subsector, the variable can take 
the value of 0 (no incentive regulation) or 1 (presence of incentive regulation). The averages are 
multiplied by 6 to achieve the scale of 0 to 6. For the transport sector, an arithmetic average is 
computed using data for rail, road and air transportation in a similar manner. The variable is 
obtained the same way for the telecommunication sector using information for the four 
subsectors: fixed line network, fixed line services, mobile phone, and internet. 
Absence of price regulation source: responses to questionnaires sent out to OECD governments. 
The variable ranges from 0 to 6. The construction of this variable corresponds to that of incentive 
regulation. The subsector-level dummy variable takes the value of 1 if there has never been price 
regulation or if prices has been fully deregulated, and 0 otherwise. 
Controls 
Real interest rate source: AMECO of the European Commission and STAN. Long-term nominal 
interest rates (i) deflated by past annual changes in the sectoral deflator (ddef) drawn from the 
Stan database. The annual inflation rate is obtained as ((1+i)/(1+ddef)-1)*100.  
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